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that a common carrier cannot limit his liability so as to cover his
own or his servants' negligence. Nor do I suppose this possible
of any bailee. But it is clear that by cofitract he may be placed
in the position of a limited insurer, excepting negligence, instead
of an insurer against everything but the act of God or public
enemies. If he be compensated only for the former risk instead
of th6 latter, at the choice of the consignor, it would be contrary
to common honesty to compel him to make, good a risk he is not
paid for assuming. We think this case was well decided at Nisi
Prius, and the
Judgment is affirmed.
WODWAR , 0. J., dissented as to ,the onus probandi.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXEMPTION CLAUSE OF THE
BANKRUPT ACT.
[An article haying appeared in a previous number of this .Journal (October
1867), on the constithtionality of the concluding exemption clause in the Bankrupt
Act, we give, by request of the framer of the bill, the remarks of Senator POLAND
in the course of the earnest and very able debate on this portion of the act in the'
Senate. See Congressional Globe, February 2d 1867, page 962, &c.-EDs. Am.
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Mr. POLAND.-Mr. President: I confess that were it not f6r
the very confident manner in which members of the Senate, whose
opinions are entitled to very great respect, especially upon legal
subjects, hav.e declared their opinion that this adoption of the
Homestead Exemption Laws of the different states renders this.
law open tb the objection that it is not uniform, I should have
felt that the objection was entirely irivolous.
I think, if it.were in our power, if it were possible for us to
adopt the systems of the different states in relation to the exemp.
tios in favor of poor debtors, every member of the Senate would
say that as a matter of - discretion, as a matter of judgment, as a
matter of prudence, as a matter of safe and proper legislation, it'
was better to leave that subject to be regulated by the state legis.
latures, who know the circumstances, the wants, the condition of
all their inhabitants, rich and poor, better than we can. All
would agree that it had better be left to them to say what m-rcy
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should be shown to the poor debtor. how the balance should be
struck between the creditor and the debtor in their respective
localities, than we can determine here in this Senate Chamber.
This is not the objection ; it is that under the Constitution we
have not the p6wer; that if we leave any exemptions at all in
favor of the debtors who either voluntarily go into this system for
the purpose of becoming relieved of their debts, or are driven
into it by their creditors, if anything is to be left to them that
does not go into their assets for division among their creditors,
if anything is to be doled out to them or retained to them out of
their property, it must -be by some uniform rule that must be
written down in the law itself.
Mr. President, it seems to me that this is not necessary in
order to make this a uniform system of bankruptcy., All the
states have exemption laws, and they are different ia their terms.
Some exempt a greater amount of real estate than others; a
greater amount of personal property is exempted in some states
than in others; but all the states have laws on the subject. They.
have regulated it according to their own judgment. They say
that a debtor may, for his own subsistence and for his family,
retain a certain amount of property that shall not be liable to be
taken by any legal process for payment of his debts. No question is raised here, none ever has been raised, but that those state
laws are entirely constitutional. It has been decided over and
over again that Athe states may make additional exemptionis of
property as againcst debts that were already in existence at the
time. So no question arises but that thi.state laws, providing
that certain property may be retained by debtors against their
creditors, are valid and constitutional and binding.
Now, what does this bill propose to do, as the House passed it ?
We propose simply to get up a law and adapt legal machinery ta
it, by which all- the property of every bankrupt throughout the
United States that is liable for the payment of his debts may be
taken and administered and distributed equally.among the creditors. This is all this amounts to. If there were no exemp.
tions by state laws and we were to make an exemption ; if by
existing laws all the property of every debtor unroughout the
country was liable for the payment of his debts and we were to
undertake to establish a system of administration throughout the
entire country, I should agree, I think, that we must make an
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exemption that should be uniform in all the states ; but that is
iot what we attempt to do. By this bill we lay hold of, we seize
all the property of every bankrupt that is liable for the payment
of his debts by law, against which the creditors have any right
to proceed by any process in the state courts, or -in the United
States courts; and we say that all that property shall be taken
and be distributed, in a particular way equally among all the
creditors.
Is not that uniform ? In order to comply with this requirement
of the Constitution , to have the system of bankruptcy uniform, is
it necessary that it must. operate in every state precisely alike .,
Are there not a great variety of contracts that are binding and
legal and valid and hold a man's property in, one state that would
be entirely invalid and inoperative to hold his property in another
state ?
But it may be. said that this proves nothing, because a dontract
valid by the laws of the state where made must be valid everywhere. But under the Bankrupt Law of 1841 the question arose
in relation to statute liens. I mentioned-the other day the controversy that arose in New England, beginning between Judge
STORY and Judge PARKER, who was then'Chief Justice of New
Hampshire, in relation to our New England attachment liens; I
believe they are not known, out of New England, in any part of
the United States as an ordinary process.
With us in New
England, when a man brings an action for the collection of a debt,
if he can find property of the debtor, he sends out the sheriff and
seizes it upon the writ in advance of any judgment, without filing
any affidavit that the party is going to abscond or has property
concealed. It is. a matter of right with him. The Bankrupt
Law of 1841 provided that liens upon property should be saved
from the operation of the Bankrupt. Law. The- question arose
whether these statute liens in New England -came within the
meaning of the Bankrupt Law, and it waseventually settled that
they did ; they were sustained.
It was utterly impossible that any such lien could exist in any
state out of New England under any state law ; there were'no
such liens on property elsewhere. If the Bankrupt LaW of 1841
protected those liens upon property in New England, it established a rule for New England that was different from that estab
'!shed in any other state, and saved a kind- of claims upon pro

